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Abstract
We construct a theoretical model that examines the relationship between HIV/AIDS and foreign direct investment
and employ panel data from 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to test the implications of the model. We ﬁnd
that HIV/AIDS has a negative but diminishing effect on FDI. Furthermore, the adverse effect occurs even when the
HIV prevalence rate is as low as 0.1%. The result has important policy implications for SSA countries.
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under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
JEL classification: F21; I15; O19
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; HIV/AIDS⁎ Cor
yi.jin@
1 Tel
2 Tel
3 The
Hansen
Pee
http://d
2214-8
under tWhen labor supply, its quality and potential productivity are diminished as a result of HIV/AIDS,
these trends act to discourage foreign direct investment, that is essential for economic development.
[ILO (2005:8).]1. Introduction
The above quote suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) is important for economic
development and that HIV/AIDS impedes FDI.3 Indeed, the negative effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI isresponding author. Tel.: +61 3 99032042; fax: +61 3 99031128.E-mail addresses: asiedu@ku.edu (E. Asiedu),
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growth enhancing and poverty reducing effect of FDI has also been documented in several empirical studies (e.g.,
and Rand, 2006).
r review under responsibility of Afreximbank.
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.joat.2015.01.001
515 © 2015 Afreximbank. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an open access article
he CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–17consistent with the 2003 World Economic Forum (WEF) survey, where about 33% of business
leaders in developing countries that participated in the survey reported that HIV/AIDS has “affected
their country's access to FDI in the past five years.”4 It is important to note that examining the effect
of HIV/AIDS on FDI is crucial for countries in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) for the following two
reasons. First, FDI is crucial for poverty reduction in SSA, however, the region has received very little
FDI and the investments are concentrated in only a few countries (Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong,
2008; see Table 2). Second, a majority of the people infected with HIV/AIDS live in SSA (about 66%
of the 33 million people infected with the disease live in SSA); the region has the highest new
infection rates (in 2009, about 71% of newly infected adults lived in SSA); and the disease is the
leading cause of death among adults in the region (UNAIDS, 2010).5
This paper theoretically and empirically examines the relationship between HIV/AIDS and FDI.
Specifically, we construct a model that examines the relationship between HIV/AIDS and FDI and employ
panel data from 41 countries in SSA over the period 1990–2008 to test the implications of the model. For
the theoretical model, we show that HIV/AIDS has a negative and non-linear effect on FDI, and we derive
the conditions under which the non-linear effect is negative and diminishing. For the empirical analysis, we
find that HIV/AIDS has a negative effect on FDI, the adverse effect occurs even when the prevalence rate is
low (as low as 0.1%), and the negative effect diminishes as the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate rises. We also
show that our results are robust: they hold when we control for market size, openness to trade, infrastructure
development, and natural resource intensity in host countries.
The idea that HIV/AIDS may have an adverse effect on FDI is not implausible, for the simple
reason that healthy workers are more productive than sick workers. As a consequence, one would
expect the health status of workers in host countries to have an impact on FDI. It is therefore
surprising that although there is an extensive empirical literature on the determinants of FDI to
developing countries in general, and to Sub-Saharan African countries in particular, research on how
the health status of workers in host countries affects FDI is scant and also recent.6 We found only
three papers that have included a measure of health as a determinant of FDI: Alsan et al. (2006),
Azemar and Desbordes (2009), and Ghosh and Francesco (forthcoming). Alsan et al. (2006: 613) note
that “To date, however, a relationship between population health and FDI has not been established in
the empirical literature.” They also assert that “To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first
empirical investigation evaluating whether health directly affects FDI, ceteris paribus,” (2006:614).
This paper contributes to the thin literature on this important topic. Alsan et al. (2006) analyze the
effect of life expectancy on FDI flows to developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature survey and
Section 3 discusses some stylized facts about HIV/AIDS and FDI flows to SSA. Section 4 presents
the theoretical model, Section 5 describes the data and the variables employed in the regressions,
Section 6 reports of the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
As indicated in the introduction, our literature review revealed only three papers that have included
a measure of health as a determinant of FDI. Alsan et al. (2006) analyze the effect of life expectancy
on FDI flows to developing countries. Azemar and Desbordes (2009) analyze the indirect effect of4 See Bloom et al. (2003) for a discussion of the survey results.
5 Also, the top ten countries in the world with the highest HIV prevalence rates are all located in SSA: Swaziland (27%),
Botswana (25%), Lesotho (25%), South Africa (21%), Zimbabwe (18%), Namibia (17%), Zambia (16%), Mozambique (14%),
Malawi (13%) and Tanzania (7%).
6 See Anyanwu (2012) and Asiedu (2002) for an analysis of the determinants of FDI to SSA.
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HIV, tuberculosis and malaria on life expectancy, and then examine the effect of life expectancy on
FDI. Ghosh and Francesco (forthcoming) analyze the effect of communicable diseases on FDI to
developing countries. All the studies conclude that good health promotes FDI.
This paper extends the health-FDI literature in three ways. First, unlike previous studies, the
empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model with microfoundations. In addition, the model
reflects two of the most important channels through which HIV/AIDS can affect FDI: a decline in
productivity and an increase in absenteeism.7 Second, the paper addresses some specification and
endogeneity issues not considered in previous studies. Specifically, we find that the relationship
between HIV/AIDS and FDI is non-linear, while in Azemar and Desbordes (2009) HIV is treated as
linear in their regressions. With regard to endogeneity, the analysis of Oster (2009) and Herzer and
Nunnenkamp (2012) points to the possibility that FDI may have a causal effect on HIV/AIDS,
suggesting that the relationship between FDI and HIV/AIDS may be bi-directional.8 Also, the data on
HIV prevalence rates are likely to exhibit measurement errors (Bloom and Canning, 2008).9 These
two potential problems suggest that endogeneity may be a concern. In our empirical analysis, HIV/
AIDS is treated as endogenous. Another issue is that several studies have found that past FDI is
correlated with current FDI as in Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Asiedu et al. (2009). However, Alsan
et al. (2006), Azemar and Desbordes (2009) and Ghosh and Francesco (forthcoming) do not take into
account the persistent nature of FDI. We introduce the lagged FDI into the regression to capture its
persistence. The system GMM estimator that we employ for our estimations accounts for unobserved
country-specific effects, mitigates any potential endogeneity problems, permits the inclusion of
lagged dependent variable as well as endogenous explanatory variables, and also accommodates
panel data with short time periods.
The third contribution of the paper to the health-FDI literature is that it is the first paper to analyze
the direct effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI. We focus on the effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI for the following
reasons. First, HIV/AIDS is a global epidemic and the disease “has inflicted the single greatest
reversal in human development in modern history” (UNDP, 2005: 10). Furthermore, the adverse
effect of ill health on FDI is more profound for HIV/AIDS than other chronic and infectious disease.10
Finally, we argue that life expectancy is not appropriate for analyzing the impact of the health of
workers on FDI for the following reasons: (i) it reflects the health status of the total population,
including children and the elderly, two groups that are not part of the labor force; (ii) it measures
mortality rates—does not take into account morbidity (sickness) rates (Bloom et al., 2003); (iii) it is7 For example in Swaziland, about 25% of the workers are absent from work every month because of HIV/AIDS (IRIN,
2009). Also, data from the 2003 WEF global survey and the 2005 South African Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS suggest that
lower productivity and increased absenteeism are the main channels through which HIV/AIDS affects businesses. See Bloom et
al. (2003) for a discussion of the survey results.
8 Oster (2009) ﬁnds that exports have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that
export-oriented FDI (which is the type of FDI in most developing countries) may have a signiﬁcant impact on HIV. The data on
FDI by sector are not readily available for most SSA countries so we are unable to test this hypothesis. Hezer and Nunnenkamp
(2012) ﬁnd that FDI has a negative and signiﬁcant impact on life expectancy in host countries.
9 See Bloom and Canning (2008) for a detailed discussion.
10 This observation is consistent with the 2003 WEF survey data. Speciﬁcally, about 60% of the ﬁrms operating in SSA
reported that HIV/AIDS has a “serious impact” on their businesses. This contrasts with 50% for malaria and 39% for
tuberculosis. The relatively large adverse effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI, vis-a-vis other infectious diseases, can be largely
attributed to the fact that unlike other diseases, the most vulnerable group to HIV infection are working-age adults. About 92%
of the people infected with HIV/AIDS are in the 15–49 age group (UNAIDS, 2010). Furthermore, in many moderate and high
epidemic countries, the disease has led to a signiﬁcant reduction in the size of the labor force, in particular, educated/skilled
workers. If human capital and physical capital are complementary, then a decrease in the quality and quantity of human capital
will result in a decline in physical capital (Sala-i-Martin, 2005).
4 E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–17highly correlated with other country characteristics that affect FDI flows (e.g., income per capita,
infrastructure development), and this makes it difficult to isolate the effect of health on FDI.
The paper also contributes to the small but increasing literature that examines the effect of HIV/
AIDS on the growth rate of income per capita. The findings from these studies are mixed. Some
studies find a positive effect of HIV/AIDS on growth (e.g.,Young, 2005; McDonald and Roberts,
2006), others find a negative effect (e.g., Juhn et al., 2008; Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan, 2010), and
some conclude that HIV/AIDS has no significant effect on income per capita growth (e.g., Bloom and
Mahal, 1997).11 Haacker (2004) asserts that the existing studies underestimate the effect of HIV/
AIDS on growth. He argues that the existing studies analyze only the direct effect of HIV/AIDS on
growth, and do not take into consideration the fact that the disease can impact growth indirectly by
decreasing FDI. This paper contributes to the literature by examining one of the channels through
which HIV/AIDS may indirectly affect economic growth.
3. HIV and FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa: some stylized facts
This section provides some stylized facts about HIV and FDI flows to SSA from 1990–2013.
Table 1 shows the HIV prevalence rate for ages 15–49, and Tables 2 and 3 show net-FDI flows and
FDI as a share of GDP to SSA, respectively.
3.1. HIV stylized facts
• The HIV prevalence rate increased from 1990–2004 and declined from 2005–2013. Over the
period 1990–1994 to 2000–2004, the HIV prevalence rate increased by about 96% (from 3.2% to
6.3%) and it declined by about 19% over the period 2004–2013 (from 6.3% to 5.2%).
• The HIV prevalence rate varies significantly across country. For example, the prevalence rate for
the period 2010–2013 ranges from a low of 0.2% for Sudan and 0.5% for Senegal, to a high of
27.4% and 22.9% for Swaziland and Lesotho, respectively.
• The HIV prevalence rate is higher for the countries in Southern Africa. The top five countries are
all located in Southern Africa. For example for the period 2010–2013, the prevalence rate for the
countries in Southern Africa (Bostwana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and
Zimbabwe) was about 20.1%, compared to 2.8% for the other countries in the region.
3.2. FDI stylized facts
• FDI to SSA has increased substantially since 1990. Over the period 1990–1994 to 2010–2013,
FDI increased by about 170% in real terms (1980 constant US dollars), from $1503 million to
$17,719 million (Table 2). In addition, FDI as a share of GDP increased by about 360%, from
1.52% to about 6.98% (Table 3).
• FDI to SSA is concentrated in oil exporting countries. However, the degree of concentration has
declined substantially over time. For example the share of FDI to the top four oil exporting
countries (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sudan) declined from about 61% in 1990–1994
to about 14% in 2010–2013 (Table 2). In addition FDI to the four oil exporting countries increased
by about 12% in real terms over the period 1990–1994 to 2010–2013 (from $911.82 million to
$3085.93 million). This compares with an increase of about 280% (from $591.53 million to
$14,633.13 million) for the other SSA countries.11 See Bloom et al. (2004) for a survey of the literature on the effect of health on growth.
Table 1
HIV prevalence rate for ages 15–49, 1990–2013.
Source: WDI (2011) and authors' calculations.
Country 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2013
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 3.2 5.6 6.3 5.8 5.2
Southern African 6.9 18.0 22.1 21.0 20.1
Outside Southern Africa 2.66 3.68 3.85 3.40 2.80
Botswana 9.7 23.9 27.3 24.7 21.9
Lesotho 3.6 16.6 22.0 22.1 22.9
Namibia 3.0 11.3 16.6 15.8 14.3
Southern Africa
Botswana 9.7 23.9 27.3 24.7 21.9
Lesotho 3.6 16.6 22.0 22.1 22.9
Namibia 3.0 11.3 16.6 15.8 14.3
South Africa 1.5 9.1 16.5 18.7 19.1
Swaziland 5.1 18.7 25.6 26.3 27.4
Zimbabwe 18.4 28.0 24.9 18.3 15.0
Outside Southern Africa
Angola 0.5 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.4
Benin 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.1
Burkina Faso 3.8 3.3 2.1 1.2 0.9
Burundi 0.6 1.7 2.5 1.9 1.0
Cape Verde 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Cameroon 2.1 4.2 5.3 5.1 4.3
Central African Republic 5.2 8.4 8.4 6.0 3.8
Chad 1.6 2.7 3.6 3.5 2.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1
Congo, Rep. 5.1 5.7 4.8 3.6 2.5
Cote d'Ivoire 4.5 6.6 6.4 4.5 2.7
Eritrea 1.0 2.1 2.0 1.1 0.6
Ethiopia 1.8 3.8 3.7 2.2 1.2
Gabon 1.5 3.9 5.8 5.5 3.9
Gambia 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.2
Ghana 1.2 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.3
Guinea 0.4 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.7
Guinea-Bissau 1.1 2.6 3.7 4.0 3.7
Kenya 5.7 10.4 8.4 6.3 6.0
Liberia 1.4 2.8 3.0 2.0 1.1
Madagascar 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4
Malawi 14.5 17.0 17.1 14.2 10.3
Mali 0.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 0.9
Mauritius 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.1
Mozambique 1.5 4.8 9.1 11.3 10.8
Niger 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.4
Nigeria 1.5 2.8 3.6 3.7 3.2
Rwanda 6.1 5.7 4.3 3.2 2.9
Sao Tome 0.2 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.6
Senegal 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
Sierra Leone 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.6 1.6
Somalia 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5
South Sudan 0.6 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.2
Sudan 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Tanzania 6.8 8.7 7.7 6.2 5.0
Togo 1.2 2.9 4.0 3.5 2.3
Uganda 12.2 9.3 6.7 6.4 7.4
Zambia 14.3 14.7 14.3 13.4 12.5
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Table 2
Foreign direct investment net inflows for selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2013 (constant 1980 US$, millions).
Source: WDI (2011) and authors' calculations.
Country 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2013
Total FDI to SSA 1503.35 4197.99 6560.78 13,732.27 17,719.06
Top four oil exporting countries 911.82 1595.69 2740.64 4437.15 3085.93
Other SSA countries 591.53 2602.31 3820.14 9295.12 14,633.13
Share of FDI to top four oil exporting countries (%) 60.65 38.01 41.77 32.31 17.42
Top four oil exporting countries 911.82 1595.69 2740.64 4437.15 3085.93
Angola 147.11 581.70 1069.74 159.50 −1944.03
Equatorial Guinea 13.19 123.30 271.51 321.42 963.22
Nigeria 742.44 784.14 896.16 3154.81 3077.72
Sudan 9.09 106.55 503.23 801.42 989.02
Other SSA countries 591.53 2602.31 3820.14 9295.12 14,633.13
Benin 37.22 19.15 25.02 14.23 91.01
Botswana −29.01 46.75 248.07 173.37 174.42
Burkina Faso 3.47 6.02 9.21 23.89 98.81
Burundi 0.44 0.53 1.30 0.51 1.29
Cape Verde 1.11 16.09 18.20 71.75 36.94
Cameroon −13.77 48.36 139.26 121.18 255.13
Central African Republic −2.87 3.99 4.23 25.23 19.00
Chad 7.81 20.34 296.93 13.77 164.59
Comoros 0.25 0.26 0.35 2.66 6.22
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.35 3.83 121.23 347.43 1038.67
Congo, Rep. 46.84 106.05 98.53 900.73 1122.13
Cote d'Ivoire −0.07 200.11 129.51 193.92 150.85
Ethiopia 4.70 81.96 193.90 131.75 239.33
Gabon −9.11 −140.72 42.65 213.65 306.32
Gambia 6.81 6.27 20.45 32.11 14.76
Ghana 56.05 89.99 65.42 701.26 1368.27
Guinea 10.70 15.40 24.22 110.11 188.18
Guinea-Bissau 1.84 2.21 1.15 4.90 5.31
Kenya 31.76 36.47 30.11 97.94 143.44
Lesotho 8.22 157.51 21.05 58.45 69.12
Liberia 25.18 66.66 53.15 70.95 424.96
Madagascar 10.56 13.62 28.43 327.70 364.41
Malawi 2.77 13.38 29.27 52.63 52.83
Mali 0.88 28.80 75.52 152.66 208.11
Mauritania 4.69 2.31 75.12 140.01 363.17
Mali 0.88 28.80 75.52 152.66 208.11
Mauritania 4.69 2.31 75.12 140.01 363.17
Mauritius 14.56 21.54 38.42 108.67 190.78
Mozambique 16.73 97.11 146.72 211.09 1894.42
Namibia 56.88 58.86 36.33 287.40 358.59
Niger 9.01 4.31 8.31 106.58 371.81
Rwanda 2.72 1.98 3.09 33.16 46.74
Sao Tome −0.32 0.99 1.92 17.83 15.08
Senegal 18.46 55.08 33.53 154.00 131.44
Seychelles 13.28 29.59 25.85 73.08 68.62
Sierra Leone 3.24 1.30 14.30 39.51 258.26
Somalia 1.13 0.33 −0.58 44.10 47.78
South Africa 76.58 991.87 1241.94 3021.20 2294.50
Swaziland 45.17 38.67 24.47 27.47 43.00
Tanzania 11.15 139.72 203.91 411.57 741.40
Togo 2.05 17.16 27.93 33.50 52.86
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Table 2 (continued)
Country 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2013
Uganda 19.01 96.00 110.24 327.52 422.56
Zambia 85.88 97.76 144.23 380.05 637.24
Zimbabwe 9.20 104.70 7.25 35.62 150.81
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As pointed out earlier, two of the most important channels through which HIV/AIDS can affect FDI is a
reduction in labor productivity and an increase in absenteeism. We incorporate the productivity/
absenteeism effect of the epidemic on FDI by including three features in the model. First, we assume that
infected workers have lower productivity than uninfected workers. Second, infected workers take days off
from work when they fall sick.12 The third feature is related to a negative externality of the disease. The
morbidity (sickness) rate and the mortality (death) rate of HIV/AIDS are quite high. The sickness and death
of infected co-workers may affect the working environment and lower morale at the workplace. In addition,
uninfected workers may be reluctant to interact with infected workers for fear of being infected. Clearly,
these factors lead to a reduction in overall productivity at the workplace. We incorporate such a negative
externality by assuming that infected workers lower the productivity of all workers. Thus the total
(labor-augmented) productivity can be decomposed into two parts: the “idiosyncratic” part which is
determined by the individual's HIV status and “non-idiosyncratic” part which is determined by the overall
health of the entire labor force. Therefore, the HIV prevalence rate enters the goods production function as a
determinant of effective units of labor.13 Later we show that the existence of such an externality is crucial in
establishing the non-linear effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI.
We now describe the model. Consider an environment where a host country maximizes utility by
choosing consumption, labor and foreign capital (i.e., FDI). Specifically, the country uses capital, k,
and labor, n, to produce output according to the following production function:
f k; nð Þ ¼ kθn1−θ: ð1Þ
Here, k = kd + kf, where kd is domestic capital and kf is foreign-owned capital. Assume that capital
depreciates completely, thus kf is simply FDI. We assume that kd is exogenously determined and kf
earns a rate of return r, determined by the world capital market.
The population of workers in the host country is normalized to unity. Let h ∈ (0,1) be the share of
the workers that are HIV positive. We use subscripts “1” and “2” to refer to uninfected and infected
workers, respectively. Denoted by n1 the labor supply of uninfected workers, and n2 the labor supply
of infected workers. Then the effective labor supply is equal to (1 − h)n1 and αhn2, respectively, with
α ∈ (0,1) reflecting the assumption that infected workers have lower productivity. To take into
account the negative externality, we introduce a discount factor on the quality of labor supplied by all12 Grossman (1972) also includes sick time as a source of disutility, based on the argument that health capital differs from other
forms of human capital: a person's stock of knowledge affects his market and nonmarket productivity while his stock of health
determines the total amount of time available for his market and nonmarket activities.
13 In the health-development literature, health is usually considered an important component of human capital and enters the
goods production function either as a factor of input (Bloom et al, 2004; McDonald and Roberts, 2006), or as a determinant of
the total factor productivity (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2008).
Table 3
Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) for selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2013.
Source: WDI (2011) and authors' calculations.
Country 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2013
Angola 3.22 16.31 17.37 0.84 −2.68
Benin 3.48 1.45 1.27 0.68 2.21
Botswana −1.15 1.53 7.70 3.56 3.91
Burkina Faso 0.08 0.36 0.41 0.71 1.72
Burundi 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.08
Cape Verde 0.37 4.69 4.03 10.94 6.88
Cameroon −0.21 0.98 2.33 1.17 1.91
Central African Republic −0.46 0.65 0.83 3.43 2.80
Chad 0.48 2.04 27.50 0.27 1.75
Comoros 0.18 0.13 0.28 1.33 2.28
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.01 0.23 2.76 4.95 7.39
Congo, Rep. 4.25 7.70 5.70 22.84 21.40
Cote d'Ivoire −0.17 2.83 1.87 1.99 1.52
Equatorial Guinea 17.00 68.22 29.44 7.57 10.79
Ethiopia 0.02 2.00 4.65 1.47 1.37
Gabon −0.03 −3.63 1.49 3.71 3.77
Gambia, The 2.03 1.35 6.67 8.71 5.47
Ghana 0.75 2.08 1.50 6.84 7.63
Guinea 0.66 0.85 1.51 6.32 11.97
Guinea-Bissau 1.40 1.78 0.54 1.61 1.67
Kenya 0.88 0.49 0.27 0.90 0.84
Lesotho 1.70 29.78 4.39 8.22 8.26
Liberia 5.68 25.07 27.32 20.02 54.06
Madagascar 0.60 0.67 0.96 10.19 8.88
Malawi −0.02 1.31 2.43 2.52 2.62
Mali −0.08 1.17 4.26 4.31 4.46
Mauritania 0.66 0.20 9.72 4.54 17.91
Mauritius 0.77 0.90 0.35 3.20 4.06
Mozambique 1.01 4.31 6.51 5.69 24.64
Namibia 2.55 2.01 1.14 7.59 7.27
Niger 0.64 0.36 0.67 5.08 11.37
Nigeria 4.02 3.73 2.74 3.99 2.56
Rwanda 0.24 0.19 0.26 1.92 1.94
Senegal 0.30 2.08 0.96 3.04 2.45
Seychelles 4.20 8.22 7.54 17.45 14.69
Sierra Leone 1.04 0.09 1.66 3.54 16.81
South Africa 0.04 1.17 2.06 2.21 1.48
Sudan −0.06 1.90 5.96 3.72 3.61
Swaziland 5.48 4.12 2.32 2.73 2.40
Tanzania 0.19 2.88 3.08 4.35 5.18
Togo −0.05 1.80 3.37 2.42 3.12
Uganda 0.42 2.58 3.12 5.93 5.91
Zambia 4.55 5.04 6.79 7.27 6.07
Zimbabwe 0.14 2.58 0.17 1.12 2.62
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.52 4.87 4.91 5.02 6.98
8 E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–17workers, γ(h), with γ(h) ∈ (0,1). We assume γ′(h) b 0. This assumption implies that the negative
externality gets bigger as the prevalence rate increases. Note that α pertains to only infected workers
(i.e., the “idiosyncratic” productivity parameter) but γ(h) affects all workers (i.e., the
“non-idiosyncratic” productivity parameter). Thus, the aggregate effective labor supply (adjusted
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n ¼ γ hð Þ 1−hð Þn1 þ hαn2½ : ð2Þ
For simplicity, we assume that the utility function is separable in consumption, c, and leisure time,
l, and takes the form:
u c; lð Þ ¼ lncþ ηlnl; ð3Þ
where η N 0. The time endowment is normalized to be equal to one. Let s be the sick time taken off by
infected workers, then the effective time endowment of infected workers is 1 − s. Therefore the time
constraint faced by healthy and infected workers are given by Eqs. (4) and (5), respectively:
n1 ¼ 1−l1; ð4Þ
n2 ¼ 1−s−l2: ð5Þ
Finally the resource constraint for the host country is:
1−hð Þc1 þ hc2 ¼ f kd þ k f ; n
 
−rk f : ð6Þ
The host country chooses c1, c2, l1, l2, and kf to maximize:
U ¼ 1−hð Þu c1; l1ð Þ þ hu c2; l2ð Þ; ð7Þ
subject to Eqs. (1)–(6).
Let λ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraint (Eq. (6)). The first order
conditions are given by:
c1 :
1
c1
¼ λ; ð8Þ
c2 :
1
c2
¼ λ; ð9Þ
k f : θ k=nð Þθ−1 ¼ r; ð10Þ
l1 : γ hð Þ 1−θð Þ k=nð Þθ ¼ c1l1 ; ð11Þ
l2 : αγ hð Þ 1−θð Þ k=nð Þθ ¼ c2l2 : ð12Þ
Clearly Eqs. (8) and (9) imply that c1 = c2 = c.
14 Eq. (10) shows that the marginal product of
capital equals the world interest rate, yielding a constant capital–labor ratio:
k
n
¼ θ
r
  1
1−θ
:
The next two first-order conditions reflect that workers' marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure equals their marginal product of labor. It is straightforward that these two14 This result comes from the assumption that healthy and infected workers have the same utility function. If infected workers,
due to illness, derive less enjoyment than healthy workers from same quantity of consumption goods, then c1 and c2 will be
different. The consumption choice is not essential for our result.
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l1 ¼ αl2: ð13Þ
Since infected workers have lower productivity (α b 1) and take sick time off (s N 0), thus
n1 N n2, infected workers supply less labor. Combining Eqs. (6) and (10), and substituting Eqs (4),
(5), and (13) into Eq. (2), we end up with the following two equations determining n and l1 in the
equilibrium:
γ hð Þ 1−θð Þ k
n
 θ
¼ k
n
 θ
n−θ
k
n
 θ−1 k
n
n−kd
 
;
n ¼ γ hð Þ 1−hð Þ 1−l1ð Þ þ hα 1−s−l1=αð Þ½ :
Totally differentiating the above with respect to h yields
dn
dh
¼ γ hð Þ α 1−sð Þ−1½  þ γ
0 hð Þ 1−hþ hα 1−sð Þ½ 
1þ η :
And the effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI is summarized by
dk f
dh
¼ k
n
dn
dh
¼ −γ hð Þ 1−α 1−sð Þ½  þ γ
0 hð Þ 1−hð Þ þ hα 1−sð Þ½ 
1þ ηð Þ r=θð Þ 11−θ
; ð14Þ
and
d2k f
dh2
¼ −2γ
0 hð Þ 1−α 1−sð Þ½  þ γ″ hð Þ 1−hð Þ þ hα 1−sð Þ½ 
1þ ηð Þ r=θð Þ 11−θ
: ð15Þ
Clearly dkf/dh b 0 as long as any one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (i) α b 1; (ii)
s N 0 or (iii) γ′ (h) b 0. This implies that HIV/AIDS has an adverse effect on FDI: (i) when infected
workers have a lower productivity relative to uninfected workers, α b 1; or (ii) when infected workers
take sick time off, s N 0; or (iii) when the negative externality generated by HIV/AIDS increases with
the prevalence rate, γ′ (h) b 0.
From Eq. (15) we can see that d2kf/dh
2 N 0 if and only if
2γ0 hð Þ 1−α 1−sð Þ½ bγ″ hð Þ 1−hð Þ þ hα 1−sð Þ½ :
This condition is easy to satisfy. For example, if γ(h) is concave, then γ″(h) N 0 and hence d2kf/
dh2 N 0 Note that defining γ as a function of h is critical for the non-linearity result. It is still possible
to have dkf/dh b 0 as long as α b 1 or s N 0. However d
2kf/dh
2 will be equal to 0 once γ is
independent of h, suggesting that the effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI, although still negative, will be the
same across different values of the prevalence rate. In summary, our model implies that HIV/AIDS
has a non-linear negative effect on FDI, and the effect is diminishing under certain condition.
5. The data and the variables
The empirical analyses utilize panel data from 41 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period
1990–2008. We focus on the post-1990 years because although the HIV virus was identified in the
11E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–171980s, global awareness of the disease began in the 1990s. Furthermore, the HIV data prior to 1990
are deemed unreliable (UNAIDS, 2010).
The dependent variable is fdiwhere fdi = ln(1 + FDI), and FDI is net FDI inflows.15 As it is standard in
the literature, we average the data over three years to smooth out cyclical fluctuations. We use the
percentage of adults that are HIV positive in a country, hiv, to capture the severity of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Table 1 shows the value of hiv averaged from 1990 to 2008, for the countries in our sample.5.1. Control variables
Following the literature on the determinants of FDI, we include the following control variables in
our benchmark regressions: trade/GDP as a measure of openness to trade, gross fixed capital
formation as a share of GDP, infrac, to measure infrastructure development.16 All else equal,
openness to trade and a better physical infrastructure should have a positive effect on FDI. Large
domestic markets imply a greater demand for goods and services and therefore make the host country
more attractive for FDI. However, it is possible that the size of the market needs to achieve a certain
minimum threshold for the positive effect to be realized (Asiedu and Lien, 2003). Therefore following
Asiedu and Lien (2003), we include lgdp = Ln (GDP) and the square of GDP, lgdp × lgdp as
explanatory variables in the regressions. These variables are included in the benchmark regressions.5.2. Robustness variables
The discussion in Section 2 suggests that FDI in SSA is concentrated in natural resources.
Therefore, as a robustness check, we determine whether our main results hold when we control for
natural resource intensity in host countries. We employ three measures that reflect natural resource
intensity in host countries: (i) the share of fuels in the total merchandise exports (fuels); (ii) the share
of minerals in the total merchandise exports (minerals); and (iii) the share of fuels and minerals in
total merchandise exports (natexp = fuels + minerals). We do not include the measures of natural
resources in the benchmark regressions because the data are not available for several countries.
Specifically, the number of countries drops from 41 to 35, and the number of observations decreases
from 198 to 143.
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of the variables included in our analysis and Table 5 shows
the HIV prevalence rate for the countries in our sample, averaged over the period 1990–2008. All the
data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) published in 2011.6. Empirical results
We proceed in two steps. We first estimate the benchmark model where we control for openness to
trade, market size and infrastructure in host countries. In addition, we determine the share of countries
for which HIV/AIDS is negatively correlated with FDI. In step 2, we test whether our results are
robust when we control for natural resource intensity in host countries.15 The data on net FDI from the WDI are in thousands of dollars. Furthermore, some of the observations are negative. We
converted the data to billions of dollars and added one to ensure that all the observations are positive.
16 Gross ﬁxed capital formation includes funds spent on the construction of roads, railways, schools, commercial and industrial
buildings and land improvements.
Table 4
Summary statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Foreign direct investment/GDP (%) 276 0.02 0.05 −0.08 0.51
HIV prevalence (%) 249 5.13 6.65 0.10 28.7
Ln (GDP) 272 1.28 5.79 −31.3 38.3
Infrastructure: fixed investment/GDP (%) 261 19.7 10.2 3.47 90.3
Trade/GDP (%) 269 74.1 38.8 12.8 245.8
Fuels 181 11.4 24.4 0.00 99.4
Minerals 194 12.3 20.8 0.00 87.7
Natexp 181 23.9 29.5 0.00 99.7
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on current flows. In particular, we estimate the equation:
f diit ¼ αhivit þ βhiv2it þ ρ f diit−1 þ Σ Jj¼1γ jZ jit þ θi þ λt þ εit ð16Þ
where i refers to countries, t to time, fdi = ln(1 + FDI), hiv is HIV adult prevalence rate, Z is a vector
of control variables, and θi and λt are country-specific and time-specific effects, respectively.
We now provide some details about our estimation strategy. First, we use the two-step GMM
system estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which is asymptotically efficient and robust
to all kinds of heteroskedasticity. Second, as noted earlier, hiv, and therefore hiv2 are likely to be
endogenous. Therefore in our regressions, we specify hiv and hiv2 as endogenous variables. Third, the
control variables are treated as strictly exogenous. Finally, our regressions utilize only internalTable 5
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates for selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, averaged 1990–2008.
Source: WDI (2011) and authors’ calculations.
Country HIV rate Country HIV rate
Angola 1.40 Liberia 1.49
Benin 1.12 Madagascar 0.10
Botswana 23.2 Malawi 12.4
Burkina Faso 1.89 Mali 1.23
Burundi 3.77 Mauritania 0.50
Cameroon 5.32 Mauritius 0.51
Central African Republic 5.82 Mozambique 8.70
Chad 2.92 Namibia 12.0
Comoros 0.10 Niger 0.60
Nigeria 2.97
Congo, Rep. 4.71 Rwanda 4.97
Cote d'Ivoire 5.48 Senegal 0.45
Equatorial Guinea 2.67 Sierra Leone 1.26
Eritrea 1.22 South Africa 13.4
Ethiopia 2.29 Sudan 1.37
Gabon 4.74 Swaziland 21.2
Gambia, The 0.62 Tanzania 6.93
Ghana 2.03 Togo 3.27
Guinea 1.07 Uganda 8.82
Guinea-Bisau 1.45 Zambia 16.6
Lesotho 20.3 Zimbabwe 24.2
Table 6
Benchmark regressions. The effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI in SSA.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HIV prevalence rate (%), hiv, α^ −0.0025*** −0.0035*** −0.0031*** −0.0038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hiv × hiv, β^ 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other variables
Lagged FDI −0.3052*** −0.3328*** −0.1040*** −0.0714***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdp = Ln(GDP) −0.4149*** −0.4607*** −0.3782*** −0.4320***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdp × lgdp 0.0103*** 0.0114*** 0.0093*** 0.0105***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Trade/GDP (%) 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed investment/GDP (%) 0.00002 0.0002***
(0.777) (0.009)
Constant 4.1528*** 4.6473*** 3.8216*** 4.4542***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Critical value of hiv, hiv⁎ (%) 12.5 17.5 15.0 19.0
% of countries with hivbhiv 85.0 90.0 87.0 90.0
Number of observations 191 191 198 198
Number of countries, n 40 40 41 41
Number of instruments, i 35 50 34 49
Instrument ratio, r = n/i 1.1429 0.8000 1.2058 0.8367
Hansen J test (p-value) a 0.5521 0.6328 0.1574 0.4484
Serial correlation test (p-value) b 0.4572 0.3929 0.2945 0.2780
Limited instruments? Yes No Yes No
Notes: hiv is the percentage of adults that are HIV positive, hiv is the value of hiv averaged from 1990 to 2008; hiv = hiv⁎ when
∂fdi/∂hiv = 0.
p-Values in parenthesis. ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.10.
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the ﬁrst difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
13E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–17instruments—we do not include additional (external) instruments.17 Note that the effect of HIV/AIDS
on FDI can be derived from Eq. (16) as ∂fdi/∂hiv = α + 2β × hiv. Therefore, the parameters of
interest are α and β.6.1. Benchmark regressions
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the benchmark regressions. In columns (1) and (2) we
control for market size, trade openness and infrastructure development, infrac. However, the
coefficient of infrac is not significant (p-value = 0.777) in the regression where the number of
instruments is curtailed (column 1). When the number of lags of the variables used in instrumentation
is unrestricted, the coefficient of the measure fixed investments is rather significant at the 1% level of
significance (column 2). In columns (3) and (4), we exclude infrac and we re-estimate the model.
Three notable points follow from Table 6. First, the p-values for the test for autocorrelation and the
Hansen J test show the validity of the instruments and the absence of second order autocorrelation in
the first differenced errors. Second, α^ and β^ are significant at the 1% level in all the regressions. The17 See Asiedu and Lien (2003) for a detailed discussion about the system GMM estimation procedure.
14 E. Asiedu et al. / Journal of African Trade 2 (2015) 1–17third point is that α^b0 and β^N0, implying that HIV/AIDS has a negative and diminishing effect on
FDI. It also implies that there exists a critical value of hiv, which we denote by hiv⁎, such that
∂ f di=∂hiv ¼ α^þ 2β^  hiv ¼ 0 . Note that hiv⁎ takes on a different value for each regression.
Furthermore, ∂fdi/∂hiv b 0 when hiv b hiv⁎, suggesting that HIV/AIDS is negatively correlated with
FDI when hiv b hiv⁎. To facilitate the interpretation of our result, we define hiv as the value of hiv
averaged over the period 1990–2008, and we compute the value of hiv for each of the countries in our
sample (see Table 5). In Table 6 we also report the value of hiv⁎ and the percentage of countries for
which hivb hiv⁎. This percentage reflects the share of countries for which HIV/AIDS is negatively
correlated with FDI. Note that the value of hiv⁎ is quite high—it ranges between 12.5% and 19%.
Furthermore, HIV/AIDS has an adverse effect on FDI in at least 85% of the countries.
To further elucidate our results, we evaluate the estimated value of ∂fdi/∂hiv at reasonable values
of hiv. Specifically, we evaluate ∂fdi/∂hiv at the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles and the mean of
hiv for each sample group and we report the values in Table 7. As shown in Table 7, the estimated
value of ∂fdi/∂hiv is negative and significant at the 1% level for the various values of hiv, suggesting
that overall, HIV/AIDS has a negative impact on FDI flows. We use the regressions reported in
column (3) to illustrate our point. With the estimated coefficients, we have ∂fdi/∂hiv = −
0.0031 + 2 × 0.0001 × hiv. The 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles and the mean of hiv roughly
corresponds to the average value of hiv for Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Tanzania, South Africa and
Central African Republic respectively (see Table 5).
Table 7 also portrays the diminishing effect of HIV on FDI. One may conclude, by examining the
magnitude of β^ in Table 6, that the diminishing effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI is economically small. In
fact, it is not. Table 7 shows that the magnitude of ∂fdi/∂hiv declines significantly as hiv increases
from the 25th percentile to the 90th percentile. For example, the adverse impact of a one percentage
point increase in hiv on FDI for the 25th percentile country (i.e., Benin, with hiv ¼ 1:12) is equal to
about 7.25 times the effect in the 90th percentile country (South Africa, with hiv ¼ 13:38). This result
implies that overall, HIV/AIDS deters FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, FDI is more sensitive to
HIV/AIDS in low prevalence countries than in high prevalence countries.Table 7
∂ f di=∂hiv ¼ α^þ 2β^  hiv, evaluated at different values of hiv.
Percentile of hiv Value of hiv Corresponding country ∂fdi/∂hiv
25th 1.12 Benin −0.0029***
(0.000)
50th 2.67 Equatorial Guinea −0.0026***
(0.000)
Mean 5.78 Central Africa −0.0019***
(0.000)
75th 6.93 Tanzania −0.0017***
(0.000)
90th 13.38 South Africa −0.0004***
(0.000)
Notes: hiv is the percentage of adults that are HIV positive, and hiv is the value of hiv averaged from 1990 to 2008.
p-Values in parenthesis. ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.10.
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Table 8 reports the result of the robustness regressions. Column (1) shows the results where we
include only fuels, column (2) includes only mineral and column (3) includes both fuels and minerals.
In column (4) we natexp, where natexp = fuels + minerals.
Two main points emerge from Table 8. First, the coefficients of all the measures of natural
resource intensity are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that natural resources are
positively correlated with FDI flows to SSA. Second, and more importantly, the results are robust: α^ is
negative and significant at the 1% level and β^ is positive and significant at the 1% level in all the
regressions. In addition, the magnitudes of α^ and β^ are fairly stable across specifications.Table 8
Robustness regressions. The effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI in SSA.
(1) Fuel (2) Minerals (3) Fuels & minerals (4) Natexp
hiv, α^ −0.0022*** −0.0025*** −0.0021*** −0.0021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hiv × hiv, β^ 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other variables
Lagged FDI −0.7733*** −0.5803*** −0.7589*** −0.6801***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdp = Ln(GDP) −0.9229*** −0.7026*** −0.9452*** −0.8611***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0000 (0.000)
lgdp × lgdp 0.0213*** 0.0165*** 0.0218*** 0.0199***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0000 (0.000)
Trade = GDP (%) −0.0001*** 0.0001*** −0.0001*** −0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed investment/GDP (%) 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fuel 0.0015*** 0.0014***
(0.000) (0.000)
Minerals 0.0003*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Natexp = fuel + minerals 0.0007***
(0.000)
Constant 9.9714*** 7.4505*** 10.225*** 9.2712***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Critical value of hiv, hiv⁎ (%) 11.0 12.5 10.5 10.5
% of countries with hivbhiv 80.0 85.0 80.0 80.0
Number of observations 143 143 143 143
Number of countries, n 35 36 35 35
Hansen J test (p-value) a 0.6335 0.5527 0.7033 0.6927
Serial correlation test (p-value) b 0.1170 0.9436 0.1147 0.0643
Notes: hiv is the percentage of adults that are HIV positive, hiv is the value of hiv averaged from 1990 to 2008; hiv = hiv∗ when
∂fdi/∂hiv = 0.
p-Values in parenthesis. ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.10.
a The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals.
b The null hypothesis is that the errors in the ﬁrst difference regression exhibit no second order serial correlation.
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This paper theoretically and empirically examines the relationship between HIV/AIDS and FDI.
We derive two main results. First, HIV/AIDS deters FDI to SSA countries. If FDI promotes growth
and reduces poverty (Asiedu and Gyimah-Brempong, 2008), then our results suggest that policies that
reduce the infection rate will enhance development in SSA countries. We also find that the adverse
effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI is non-linear and that the negative effect diminishes as the HIV/AIDS
prevalence rate decreases. This implies that all else equal, a reduction in the HIV/AIDS prevalence
rate will be more beneficial to countries with low prevalence rates than countries with high prevalence
rates. Thus, for high prevalent rate countries, an initial reduction in the prevalence rate would not
generate sizable FDI; however, the flows will increase as the prevalence rate decreases.
With regard to policy, we draw from the 2014 World AIDS Day document which specifies five
ways to reduce the epidemic: encourage HIV testing, reduce discrimination, promote HIV/AIDS
education, encourage proper health care, and affirm support for people living with HIV/AIDS.18 We
also note that access to good health care, in particular, access to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs boosts the
immune system of HIV patients. In addition, there is some evidence that ARV drugs help increase
labor supply, raise productivity and reduce absenteeism at the workplace (Rosen et al., 2008;
Thirumurthy et al., 2008). Thus making ARV drugs available to infected workers may also mitigate
the adverse effect of HIV/AIDS on FDI.References
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